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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of th.e

STATE OF UTAH

FLINCO, INC., a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vsTHE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER
COMPANY, a Foreign Corporation,
Defendant - Respondent

Case No. 10321

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff filed an action against defendant claiming
a breach of a franchise agreement by wrongful termination thereof and the violation of the Anti-Monopoly
Statute of the State of Utah. The plaintiff is seeking
damage for violation of its rights as a result of said two
hasic kinds of conduct.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Judge Ray Van Cott, Jr. granted the defendant's
.Motion for Dismissal of plaintiff's action at the close of
plaintiff's case in chief on the grounds that plaintiff had
shown no right to relief and refused to submit plaintiff's
case to the jury for its consideration.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order reversing the trial court
and requiring submission of its case to the jury for
determination.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 21, 1962, plaintiff accepted a "Goodyear
Franchise Agreement" which is set up on a Goodyear
Tire Company printed form, a copy of said agreement
is attached to plaintiff's Complaint and is Exhibit No.1.
Under the "Goodyear Franchise Agreement", plaintiff was designated as a dealer in tires, batteries, and
accessories for the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company.
Plaintiff terminated a line of tires that it was handling, the Hood brand, and expended considerable amounts
of its money to set up as a Goodyear Tire dealer. It
operated under such franchise agreement until the summer of 1963, at which time defendant began to circulat 2
rumors in the Salt Lake and Ogden territories that plain-
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tiff had been cancelled as a Goodyear Tire dealer. On

16, 1963, d2f endant notified plaintiff in writing that under the terms of the Goodyear contract, plaintiff was terminated as a dealer.
~eptember

Plaintiff claims that the termination by the defendant, in addition to being wrongful in the sense that th2
terminaton occurred without notice and prior to the
notice of said September 16, 1963, was without cause.
Plaintiff claims that the termination was a part of an
overall plan and design by Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company to restrict comp2tition in rubber products,
batteries, and accessories in the State of Utah and particularly in the area in which Flinco, Inc. operated. The
termination is in violation of Title 50, Sec. 1, etc. U.C.A.,
1953. Plaintiff claims the termination was because it
had taken on an additional brand of tires for distribution
through its area, namely the Miller line.
Plaintiff's evidence shows that the Goodyear Franchise Agreement contains several contradictory and inconsistent provisions; first, paragraph 6 provides that
the Goodyear Tire Company may cancel the agreement
for failure on the part of the dealer to make payments
when due Goodyear. In paragraph 13 of the agreement, it
provides that the agreement shall expire in five years
from the date of execution and paragraph 14 provides
that the agreement may be cancelled upon thirty days
written notice by dealer to Goodyear or by Goodyear,
through its local management, to dealer.
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These provisions, the plaintiff claims are inconsistent one with another unless the thirty day cancellation
clause is interpreted to be for cause either set forth in
paragraph 6 or other good and sufficient cause. No part
of the franchise agreement contains any statement or
agreement that the agreement could be cancelled without
cause. The contract is not exclusive and Goodyear specifically reserved the right to sell in plaintiff's territory
through other dealers.
Plaintiff offered testimony concerning negotiations
and preliminary discussions prior to the execution of the
franchise agreement and the trial court refused to permit
any testimony relating to said subject (R. 67-68).
During the period prior to September 16, 1963, the
date of cancellation, plaintiff's evidence indicated that local representatives of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company
were stating that Flinco, Inc. was cancelled or was about
to be cancelled because it had taken on the Miller Tire
line. Evidence also revealed that complaints were made
to the Flinco people about their handling the Miller Tire
line although there was nothing in the franchise agreement which indicated any restriction on Flinco's handling other lines of Rubber Tire products or accessories
competitive to Goodyear.
Flinco's position is that the real and basic reason for
cancelling the dealership was the handling of the Miller
Tire line and that this action on Goodyear Tire Company's part was a violation of the Anti-Monopoly Pro-
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v1s1ons of the Laws of the State of Utah contained in
Title 50-1, etc., U. C. A., 1953.
It is plaintiff's position that the evidence presented
at the trial court presented a question of fact on each of
the issues made by the pleadings and as set forth in this
Statement of Fact and that the court violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights in refusing to submit the case
to the jury on the evidence.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE GOODYEAR FRANCHISE AGREEMENT IS AMBIGUOUS IN ITS TERMS.
POINT 2
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT
EVIDENCE OF THE NEGOTIATION AND DISCUSSION
PRIOR TO EXECUTION OF THE GOODYEAR FRANCHISE
AGREEMENT.
POINT 3
THE EVIDENCE REVEALED A VIOLATION OF TITLE
50-1-1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED BY DEFENDANT.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE GOODYEAR FRANCHISE AGREEMENT IS AMBIGUOUS IN ITS TERMS.
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The Goodyear Franchise Agreement in paragraph
6 provides:
''Upon failure of dealer to make any payment
when due, Goodyear may, at its option, cancel this
agreement or defer additional shipments until
overdo accounts have been paid."
This is the only reference in the agreement relating
to cancellation of the agreement except that paragraph
14 states:
"This agreement may be cancelled upon thirty
days written notice by the dealer to Goodyear or
by Goodyear, through its local manager, to the
dealer."
At no place in the franchise agreement is there any
other grounds set forth for cancellation of the franchise
agreement.
The franchise agreement does not provide for an
exclusive territory for plaintiff to sell in, nor does it
restrict defendant's right to sell in the area which plaintiff operates. The contract does contain in paragraphs
7, 8, 10, and 11, restrictions on the plaintiff's activities.
In no place does the defendant retain the right to cancel
the agreement except for failure to pay overdue accounts.
The defendant claimed at the time of trial, and the
Trial Court, in dismissing plaintiff's Complaint, ruled
that defendant had an unrestricted right of cancellation
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by giving thirty days written notice to plaintiff and that
no cause need be present for such cancellation.

Plaintiff contends that the right to cancel, as contained in paragraph 14, must be read in conjunction with
paragraph 6. If so interpreted, the agreement does not
give defendant an unrestricted right of cancellation.

In paragraph 13 of the agreement, it provides that
the agreement shall expire five years from the day of
execution unless previously terminated as hereinafter
provided. A fixed term of this kind would seem superfluous if the agreement is terminable at will.
The franchise agreement is a printed form supplied
by the defendant. Blanks are filled in to designate the
dealer, the types of products that he will handle, and fixing a date on which the agreement is to commence.
This court, on numerous occasions has ruled concerning such documents, that the interpretation of the
document must be most strongly against the party furnishing the form and responsible for its contents.

In the case of Barnard v. Hardy, 77 Ut. 218, 293 P.
12, this court was concerned with a real estate broker's
listing agreement. A part of the property listed had
lwen sold through the efforts of the broker. The owner
refused to pay the commision to the real estate broker.
The court examined the listing agreement and discovered
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that it did not provide for a commission in case a part
of the property was sold. After discussing the plaintiff's
claim and request that the Court should add, "Should I
sell said property or any part thereof." A ruling was
made in the following language, "The agreement was prepared by plaintiff, on a printed form furnished by him
and therefore must be construed most strongly against
him." The court then refused to add the language to make
possible commission on a partial sale of the real estate.
In Mifflin v. Shiki, 77 Ut. 190, 293 P. 1, a printed
listing agreement furnished by a real estate broker and
filled in by the broker was before the court. The question
was whether or not the broker was entitled to a commision on the trade of the list2d real estate or only where
there was a sale for cash either on an installment or full
payment transaction. This court refused to permit parol
evidence to explain the ambiguity created in the printed
part which was attempted to be cured by insertion of the
word, "trade'' on an endorsement to the printed listing
agreement. The court applied the rule that where a party
furnishes a printed form, the language is interpreted
most strongly against the party whose form is used.
A case closest to the facts before the court is Cowley
v. Anderson, (10 Cir.) 159 F. 2d 1, this case involved a
contract between a dealer and supplier of poisonous substances used for rodent control. The contract between
the dealer and the supplier provided for exclusive territory, required the dealer to exercise a certain amount of

,

9

diligence in exploiting the territory, and provid~cl that
the agreement could be terminated for lack of diligence.
The contract, as in the present case, was for a five-year
period. The Circuit Court held that under such circumstance, the contract was a five-year contract and could
not be terminated by the distributor at its will without
cause. It pointed out that even though the dealer had a
right to discontinue the contract, this does not create a
lack of mutuality and grant to the distributor a right of
termination without cause.
It would have been a simple matter had the def endant intended to reserve a right of termination, without
cause, to have clearly set this out in its printed form.
Since it did not, it is respectfully submitted that a proper
construction of the contract would adopt the plaintiff's
position that the right of cancellation was for cause
only and that there was not an unreserved right of cancellation without cause, at the unrestricted will of defendant.
POINT 2
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT
EVIDENCE OF THE NEGOTIATION AND DISCUSSION
PRIOR TO EXECUTION OF THE GOODYEAR FRANCHISE
AGREEMENT.

The negotiations preceding the execution of the
Goodyear Franchise Agreement were carried on by one
G. E. Ap Roberts, an employee of plaintiff. Plaintiff
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propounded a question to Ap Roberts concerning his discusion with one Mr. Ferguson relating to the relationship
between Flinco and Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company.
The court refused to permit the answer of Ap Roberts
(R. 67-68). Thereupon, counsel for plaintiff made an
offer of proof that the witness, Ap Roberts would state
that in all of the discussion with Ferguson, the contract
was stated to be for a five-year term and was so intended
by Ap Roberts and Flinco, Inc., that prior to the execution of the agreement it was understood that it was for
a five-year term (R. 68-69). The court refused to permit
this testimony and plaintiff claims this prejudiced its
rights.
The rules relating to parol evidence in aid of interpretation of ambiguous agreements has been discussed
on many occasions by this court. It is submitted that
there is a clear rule that the evidence is admissible to
aid in arriving at a proper and clear interpretation of
a contract and to ascertain the intentions of the parties.

Penn Star Mining Company v. Lyman, et al., 64 Ut.
343, 231 P. 107, involved an appeal from a refusal by the
trial court to permit parol evidence relating to certain
documents and contracts on which the plaintiff sought
recovery of damages. The defendant claimed the agreement and contract was obscure, uncertain, and ambiguous. The plaintiff claimed that it was perfectly clear and
wholely free from ambiguity. The Trial Court refused
to permit evidence from the defendant to show what the
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language of the agreement actually meant. This Court
reversed the Trial Court and stated that there was an
extensive and well established rule that in cases where
the language of a written instrument is obscure, uncertain, or ambiguous so that the intentions of the party
were left in doubt by an inspection of the instrument
alone, extrinsic evidence within recognized linlits is always admissible to aid the court in arriving at the true
intentions of the parties. This court in setting forth the
principle and general rule, quoted at length the case of
Salt Lake City v. Smith, 104 F. 457, 43 C.C.A. 642. In the
recent case of Continental Bank and Trust Company v.
Stewart, 4 Ut. 2d, 228, 291 P. 2d 890, cited again the Salt
Lake City v. Smith case and quoted the rule for which
that case stands in the following language:

"It is true that the express terms of an agreement may not be abrogated, nullified or modified
by parol testimony; but where, because of vagueness or uncertainty in the language used, the intent of the parties is in question, the court may
consider the situation of the parties, the facts and
circumstances surrounding the making of the contract the purpose of its execution, and the respecti~e claims thereunder, to ascertain what the
parties intended."
The Penn Star case also stands for the proposition
that where a party to a contract uses ambiguous language, the language will be interpreted most strongly
against the party using it. It cites with approval the
proposition that when there is doubt as to meaning of a
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contract, a party responsible for the language will be
held to that meaning which he knew the other party supposed the words to mean.
Plaintiff attempted through the witness Ap Roberts,
to show the court and jury what it was that the plaintiff
believed the franchise agreement meant prior to its execution, and at the time of its execution, how the plaintiff
interpreted the language of the printed form furnished
to it by defendant. In refusing to permit plaintiff to
make such showing, it is respectfully submitted the court
erred to the prejudice of the plaintiff.
Many Utah cases have applied the rule that extrinsic evidence may be admitted to show the meaning the
parties gave to the agreement and the circumstances surrounding their negotiations so that an accurate ascertainment of the parties' intentions could be achieved.
In Boley v. Butterfield, 57 Ut. 262, 194 P. 128, this
court permitted extrinsic evidence to show that a lease
of grazing permits was to be non-exclusive rather than
exclusive. It permitted the defendant to show that the
plaintiff had been advised that other persons were sharing in the grazing area and that his permit was therefore
not to be exclusive.
In Read v. Forced Uniderfiring Corporntion, 82 Ut.
529, 26 P. 2d, 325, this court permitted extrinsic evidence
to show what was meant by "net profits." The evidence

!
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revealed that at the time of the agreement, the director:,;
were not being paid and this expense was not taken into
consideration by the parties in arriving at the company's
"net profits."
In Vincent v. Federal Land Bank, 109 Ut. 191, 167
P. 2d, 279, this court permitted evidence to show that an
agreement that the property line would be at the edge of
a body of water was intended to mean the shore of the
body of water at the time of the agreement and not the
receded shore line which was claimed by the plaintiff at
the time of the trial.

In Udy v. Jens en, 63 U t. 94, 222 P. 597, this court

approved evidence that a contract involving the sale of
stock was a mere option and the buyer was not bound to
purchase, permitting evidence of statements made by the
buyer at a directors' meeting where he advised the seller
that he did not intend to be bound or jeopardize any of
his property but only purchase if he could do so. Parol
evidence was allowed to show the buyer did not intend
more than an option.

In Continental Bank and Trust Company v. Stewart,
4 Ut. 2d 228, 291 P. 2d 890, this court in a scholarly opinion permitted witnesses to testify to the meanings of
obligations and debts and to show that the debts to be
assumed by the buyer as a part of the purchase price of
real estate, were secured debts.
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In Maw v. Noble, 10 Ut. 2d 440, 354 P. 2d 121, the
court permitted extrinsic evidence to show the meaning
of an attorneys fee arrangement. It stated again the
rule that party drawing an agreement which contains an
uncertainty or ambiguity, should have the contract most
strongly construed against him. The primary and more
fundamental rule is that the contract must be looked at
realisticly in the light of circumstances under which it
was entered into and if the intent of the parties can be
ascertained with a reasonable certainty, it must be given
effect.
In the case of Cornwall v. Willow Creek Country
Club, 13 Ut. 2d 160, 369 P. 2d 928, the court set forth as
the cardinal and primary rule of interpretation which
plaintiff seeks to have applied in the present litigation
and stated:
"In interpreting a contract, the primary rule
is to determine what the parties intended by what
they said. The court may not add, ignore or discard words in the process, but attempts to render
certain the meaning of the provision in dispute
by an objective and reasonable construction of the
whole contract."
Applying the rules set down in the Cornwall case, it
would appear that only by ignoring the content of paragraph 6 of the franchise agreement, could the court rule
that the franchise agreement could be cancelled at the
will of either party. It seems clear that if it is cancell-
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able at the will of either party, no reasons such as is set
forth in paragraph 6 would be necessary for cancellation.
It is plaintiff's position that the court in interpreting the franchise agreement, should have received evidence concerning the parties intentions, circumstances,
and plans at the time the franchise agreement was entered into, to ascertain the true intent. This court has
determined, on numerous occasions, that under such circumstances, parol evidence may be received to resolve
disputes concerning the meaning of ambiguous portions
of the contract.

In Burt v. Stringfellow, 45 Ut. 207, 143 P. 234, this
court in an opinion written by Justice Frick examined
the occasions when parol evidence may be received and
set forth that it was proper to, (a) define the nature and
quality of the subject matter, (b) situation and relation
of the parties, (c) all the circumstances surrounding the
making of the contract.
In a later case, Mathis v. Madsen, 1 Ut. 2d 46, 261
P. 2d 952, the court has enlarged on the rule and set forth
the order in which the intent of the parties to a contract
that is ambiguous, should be ascertained. First, the
language of the contract should be examined, second, any
contemporary writings may be examined, and third, if
the meaning of the agreement is still uncertain, then
parol evidence of the parties' intentions and plans may
be received.
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Under all of the cases cited, the refusal by the trial
court to permit the witnesses Ap Roberts and Tate to
testify concerning the negotiations and discussions of
the Goodyear Franchise Agreement, was error.
POINT 3
THE EVIDENCE REVEALED A VIOLATION OF TITLE
50-1-1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED BY DEFENDANT.

Plaintiff's evidence revealed that agents and representatives of defendant discussed with plaintiff's agents
and representatives the fact that the plaintiff had taken
on the distribution of an additional brand of tires since
entering into the franchise agreement with Goodyear.
In one conversation, the agent, R. W. Morrow, stated
to Tate, President of Flinco, Inc. that he was in Salt
Lake for the purpose of terminating Flinco, Inc. since
they took on the Miller Tire line (R. 152). Similar statements were made on other occasions to other representatives of Flinco, Inc. (R. 90).
This evidence is important on two separate facets
of plaintiff's case; mainly on its claim for damages for
monopolistic practices and second, it indicates that the
defendant did not believe they could terminate the contract without good and sufficient cause.
The testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses to the
effect that defendant in its distribution system required
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its dealers to handle only Goodyear Tire and Rubber
products and that the termination of Flinco, Inc. was
related to its acceptance of an additional line of rubber
products for distribution, is sufficient support for plaintiff's claim of a violation of Section 50-1-2 of Utah Code
Annotated, 1953. From such testimony, the jury could
find that the deftndant was a party to an agreement
to fix or limit the amount or quality of rubber products
which could be sold in the Flinco territory.
If the jury believed Flinco's evidence, it could find

a breach of the anti-monopoly laws of the State of Utah.
Flinco would be entitled to triple damages for any damage resulting from this agreement if the termination of
its franchise was an act in furtherance of the agreement.
It is plaintiff's position that such an act would amount
to a wrongful termination.
This court has on two separate occasions, considered
the anti-monopoly laws of the State of Utah, and its
decisions clearly recognize that any attempt to fix the
price or the amount of merchandise to be distributed is
against public policy. See Gammon v. Federated Milk
Producers, 11 Ut. 2d 421, 360 P. 2d 1018, Zion Service
Corps v. Danielson, 12 Ut. 2d 369, 366 P. 2d 982.
The court did not permit plaintiff to continue with
its evidence relating to damages. It directed the verdict
on liability without permitting plaintiff to present its evi-
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dence on damages and losses by reason of the termination.
The United States Supreme Court in Standard Oil
v. U.S., 337 U.S. 293, 93 Law Ed. 1371, had before it a
claimed violation of the Clayton Act by reason of Standard Oil's exclusive contracts with its independent oil
dealers requiring them to handle only the Standard Oil
line of products.
That Court, in its opm10n, held that the contract
tying an independent dealer to the Standard products
was "a potential clog on competition" and "it would impede a substantial amount of competitive activity" and
it upheld the Trial Court's decision that Standard's tying
agreements violated the Clayton Act prohibiting monopolistic and price-fixing practices. The Standard Oil case
is a conclusive holding that if contracts similar to Goodyear Franchise Agreements are used to restrict the dealers' rights to handle other brands of rubber products,
they would be a violation of the principle of free competition and against the public policy.
The only purpose of the tying agreement is to suppress competition. Plaintiff submits defendant might be
found to have terminated the franchise agreement because Flinco, Inc. took on the Miller Tire line, and if it
is so found, triple damages would follow.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the plaintiff should
be granted a new trial and determined by this court that
the evidence is sufficient to justify plaintiff's case being
submitted to the jury on both of its theories and causes
of action.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ---------------- day
of May, 1965.
DWIGHT L. KING
Attorney for Pla.intiff-Appellant

2121 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

